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RULE 
6-404 Code of Judicial Administration 
JURISDICTION 
This is a domestic case. Jurisdiction is vested in this Court pursuant to UCA 
Section 78-2a-3(2)(h). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented for review by this Court are as hereinafter indicated. 
The general standard of review in domestic cases is clear and prejudicial abuse of 
discretion. This standard applies concerning determination of children's best 
interests, Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P.2d 472 (Utah App. 1991), Sukin v. 
Sukiii, 842 P.2d 922 (Utah App. 1992), division of property, Sheperd v. Sheperd, 
876 P.2d 429 (Utah App. 1994), Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64 (Utah App. 
1991), and alimony awards, Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P.2d (Utah App. 1994), 
Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 841 (Utah App. 1992). Some issues presented 
for appeal involves situations where Plaintiff is arguing that the trial court's ruling 
contravenes the statute. 
1. DATE DIVORCE FINAL: The trial court directed that the divorce should 
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not be final until six (6) months from the date of the Memorandum Decision. 
The trial court has authority to delay entry of a divorce for up to six (6) 
months. UCA Section 30-3-7. The Plaintiff does not dispute the trial court's 
authority to delay entry of the divorce. The Plaintiff does dispute and argue that it 
is an abuse of discretion for the trial court to exercise that authority to create debt 
for a party. 
The Plaintiff argues that the trial court abused its discretion and created a 
manifest injustice by imposing additional debt on the Plaintiff by requiring a delay 
in entering the Decree of Divorce. 
2. CUSTODY: The trial court awarded joint custody. The Plaintiff contends 
that the trial court awarded joint custody in derivation of the statutorily required 
elements required for a trial court to award joint custody. UCA Section 30-3-10.2(1) 
Custody should be awarded to Plaintiff. 
3. SUBSEQUENT CUSTODY ORDER: The trial court ruled, and the 
Decree provides, that the joint custody order may be "revisited" on motion of either 
party after Defendant completes inpatient drug/alcohol counseling. See Decree 
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paragraph 3. (page 388.') Plaintiff contends this portion of the Decree is an abuse 
of discretion as it eliminates the legal requirement of a showing of a change of 
circumstances to modify a previous order. Montano v. Third District Court for 
Salt Lake, 934 P.2d 1156 (Utah App. 1997), Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d, 51 (Utah 
1982), Grover v Grover, 839 P.2d 871 (Utah App. 1992). 
4. DEFENDANT'S DRUG TREATMENT: The trial court required, as a 
condition to Defendant's visitation of the child, that she enter and complete a thirty 
(30) to sixty (60) day inpatient drug/alcohol program to be paid for by the insurance 
provided to Plaintiffs by his employer and that the amounts not paid by the 
insurance carrier were to be paid 81% by the Plaintiff and 19% by the Defendant. 
See Decree paragraph 4. (page 388) 
Plaintiff appeals the portion of the Decree arguing that it is an abuse of 
discretion to allow Defendant to incur debt after the trial for which Plaintiff is 
obligated. Plaintiff argues that the trial court abused its discretion by requiring 
Plaintiff to pay any portion of the expense for drug/alcohol counseling not paid by 
1
 All page references are to the transcript before this Court. 
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insurance. 
5. RANDOM DRUG SCANS: The Decree requires both parties be 
subjected to random drug scans at the request of the other party. See Decree 
paragraphs, (page388) 
Plaintiff appeals this portion of the Decree. There is no Finding of Fact 
entered by the Court which would warrant this requirement of Plaintiff. This 
violates his right to privacy and right against self incrimination and is an abuse of 
discretion. 
6. MEDICAL COVERAGE FOR THE CHILD: Decree paragraph 7 (page 
389) requires Plaintiff to maintain medical coverage for the child and to pay 81% 
of the medical expenses not paid by insurance. 
Plaintiff appeals the trial court's requirement that he pay a disproportionate 
amount of medical expenses contrary to UCA Section 78-45-7.15 (5). 
7. TAX DEPENDANT: The trial court required, in paragraph 8 of the 
Decree (page 389) that the Plaintiff purchase the dependency allowance from the 
Defendant. In essence, the trial court awarded the Defendant the tax exemption for 
the child. 
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The Plaintiff appeals this portion of the Decree arguing that he should have 
been awarded the ability to claim the child as a dependent for tax purposes. 
8. PERSONAL PROPERTY: Paragraph 10 of the Decree (page 390) 
awards certain items of personal property to each party. Paragraph 11 of the Decree 
(page 393) grants the Defendant the opportunity to select which hst she wants and 
then to select six (6) items from the other hst and substitute items of equal value. 
9. PROPERTY ADJUSTMENT: Paragraph 13 of the Decree (page 393) 
attempts to equalize the personal property division by requiring the party who 
receives property of a greater value to pay the other. 
10. DEBTS: Paragraph 20A of the Decree (page 395) requires the Plaintiff 
to assume and pay certain debts which are expenses incurred for medical care to 
Defendant after the separation. 
The Plaintiff appeals this portion of the Decree as an abuse of discretion. 
11. REAL PROPERTY: Paragraph 21 of the Decree (page 396) awards 
Plaintiff the real property then subjects the property to a hen in favor of Defendant 
to secure payments required by the Decree and requires Plaintiff to pay $3,240 
concerning equity in the property. 
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The Plaintiff argues that it is an abuse of discretion considering the overall 
property award and then subject Plaintiff's interest in the real property to a hen in 
favor of the Defendant. 
12. LOAN: Paragraph 22 of the Decree (page 396) requires the Plaintiff to 
pay to Defendant one-half a loan that had a principle amount of $8,500. 
The Plaintiff appeals this ruling of the trial court as the evidence does not 
support the ruling. 
13. ALIMONY: Paragraph 23 of the Decree (page 396) requires that the 
Plaintiff pay alimony to Defendant in the amount of $200 per month for five (5) 
years, which is the duration of the marriage. The Plaintiff appeals this portion of the 
Decree as the evidence does not support the conclusion that the Plaintiff has the 
ability to pay alimony to Defendant and the FINDINGS OF FACT are not sufficient 
to support the award. 
14. DR. BURGESS: The trial court required Plaintiff to pay the fee incurred 
to the evaluator, Dr. Burgess, when she was present at the first day of trial. See 
DECREE paragraph 26. (page 397) The information to the trial court was that Dr. 
Burgess was present exclusively at the request of the Defendant. 
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The Plaintiff appeals this portion of the Decree as an abuse of discretion. 
15. ATTORNEY'S FEES: The trial court directed Plaintiff to contribute 
$5,000 towards Defendant's attorney fees. See Decree paragraph 27. (page 397) 
Plaintiff appeals this order arguing that the trial court did not find that Plaintiff had 
the ability to pay attorney fees and did not enter sufficient Findings of Fact. 
STATUTES CENTRAL TO THIS APPEAL 
1. DATE DIVORCE FINAL: The Statute allowing the trial court to delay 
entry of the date the divorce is final is UCA Section 30-3-7. That Statute is as 
follows: 
(1) The decree of divorce becomes absolute: 
(a) on the date it is signed by the court and entered by the 
clerk in the register of actions if both the parties who have a child or 
children have completed attendance at the mandatory course for divorcing 
parents as provided in Section 30-3-11.3 except if the court waives the 
requirement, on its own motion or on the motion of one of the parties, 
upon determination that course attendance and completion are not 
necessary, appropriate, feasible, or in the best interest of the parties; 
(b) at the expiration of a period of time the court may 
specifically designate, unless an appeal or other proceedings for review 
are pending; or 
(c) when the court, before the decree becomes absolute, for 
sufficient cause otherwise orders. 
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(2) The court, upon application or on its own motion for good 
cause shown, may waive, alter, or extend a designated period of time 
before the decree becomes absolute, but not to exceed six months from 
the signing and entry of the decree. 
2. CUSTODY: UCA Section 30-3-10.2 is the Statute concerning joint 
custody. UCA Section 30-3-10.2(1) states: 
(1) The court may order joint legal custody if it determines that joint legal 
custody is in the best interest of the child and: 
(a) both parents agree to an order of joint legal custody; or 
(b) both parents appear capable of implementing joint legal custody. 
3. MEDICAL COVERAGE FOR THE CHILD: UCA Section 78-45-7.15 
(5) requires the trial court to direct each party to pay equally all reasonable and 
necessary uninsured medical expenses. UCA Section 78-45-7.15 (5) states: 
(5) The order shall require each parent to share equally all reasonable and 
necessary uninsured medical expenses, including deductibles and co-
payments, incurred for the dependent children. 
4. TAX DEPENDENT: UCA Section 78-45-7.21 allows an award of the tax 
exemption for the child. UCA Section 78-45-7.21 states: 
(1) No presumption exists as to which parent should be awarded 
the right to claim a child or children as exemptions for federal and state 
income tax purposes. Unless the parties otherwise stipulate in writing, the 
court or administrative agency shall award in any final order the 
exemption on a case-by-case basis. 
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(2) hi awarding the exemption, the court or administrative agency 
shall consider: 
(a) as the primary factor, the relative contribution of each 
parent to the cost of raising the child; and 
(b) among other factors, the relative tax benefit to each 
parent. 
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (2), the court or administrative 
agency may not award any exemption to the noncustodial parent if that 
parent is not current in his child support obligation, in which case the 
court or administrative agency may award an exemption to the custodial 
parent. 
(4) An exemption may not be awarded to a parent unless the award 
will result in a tax benefit to that parent. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a divorce case. All issues were contested before the trial court. Of 
particular importance and central to the case was the issue of custody. A number 
of witnesses testified during the course of four (4) days of testimony. The case was 
initially called for trial on May 2,1996. At that time a stipulation was read into the 
record bifurcating the custody issue and establishing custody of the parties only 
child for a temporary period. This stipulation was memorialized in an ORDER 
dated June 28,1996. (page 237) Trial proceeded on all other issues. The case was 
next called on May 24,1996. The balance of the issues not related to the child were 
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concluded at that time. Trial on the custody issue was next heard on August 23, 
1996 and concluded October 1-2,1996. 
Plaintiff requests indulgence from this Court to allow references to facts 
relevant to each respective issue as supported by citation to the record within each 
portion of this BRIEF dedicated to that issue. Parenthetical references to page 
numbers are to the corresponding transcript page. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. DATE DIVORCE FINAL: Plaintiff argues that the trial court abused its 
discretion by ordering that the divorce not be final for a period of six (6) months 
after the date of the MEMORANDUM DECISION. The trial court recites the 
delay is to "allow the parties to complete and/or accomplish the requirements set 
forth herein and to continue the medical coverage for payment of the medical 
expenses incurred and/or to be incurred by the parties." The court then requires 
Plaintiff to maintain medical insurance for Defendant ant to pay 81% of the expense 
incurred for her drug/alcohol treatment not paid by insurance. 
Plaintiff argues that delay for this reason is an abuse of discretion. 
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2. CUSTODY: Plaintiff argues that the trial court's award of joint custody 
was contrary to statute. Custody should have been awarded to Plaintiff. 
3. SUBSEQUENT CUSTODY ORDER: Plaintiff argues that it is an abuse 
of discretion to eliminate the requirement of a showing of change of circumstances 
to accomplish a modification of a previous custody order. 
4. DEFENDANT'S DRUG TREATMENT: The trial court delayed the date 
the divorce was to be final for six months from the MEMORANDUM DECISION 
and required Plaintiff to maintain the medical coverage available through his 
employment to remain in force and effect thus providing insurance to pay a portion 
of the cost of Defendant's drug treatment. Further, the trial court required Plaintiff 
to pay 81% of the amounts not paid by insurance. 
Plaintiff argues that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the 
Defendant to create debt after the trial and obligating Plaintiff therefore. 
5. RANDOM DRUG SCANS: Plaintiff has appealed this decision by the 
trial court primarily as there was no finding by the trial court that Plaintiff was 
involved with drugs and, therefore, there is no reason to impose this burden on him. 
6. MEDICAL COVERAGE FOR THE CHILD: Plaintiff appeals the trial 
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court's requirement that he pay a disproportionate amount of medical expenses for 
the child contrary to UCA Section 78-45-7.15 (5). 
7. TAX DEPENDENT: There is no indication in the MEMORANDUM 
DECISION or the FINDINGS OF FACT that the trial court considered the 
requirement of UCA Section 78-45-7.21. Plaintiff argues that he should be awarded 
the child as a tax exemption. 
8. PROPERTY/DEBTS: Plaintiff challenges the method of the disposition 
of assets and allocation of debt. Particularly, Plaintiff challenges the trial court's 
requirement that he pay certain medical bills incurred by Defendant after separation. 
9. LOAN: Plaintiff appeals the trial court's requirement that Plaintiff pay 
one-half of the $8,500 loan taken by the parties before the separation as contrary to 
the testimony. 
10. ALIMONY: Plaintiff submits there is no finding that Plaintiff has the 
ability to pay alimony. The trial court's FINDINGS OF FACT are not sufficient to 
support the award. 
11. Dr. BURGESS: Dr. Burgess performed the custody evaluation She was 
present at the first day of trial at the request of the Defendant. Plaintiff argues the 
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trial court abused its discretion by requiring Plaintiflf to pay expenses associated 
with Do. Burgess' presence. 
12. ATTORNEY'S FEES: The trial court directed Plaintiflf to contribute 
$5,000 towards Defendant's attorney fees. See Decree paragraph 27. (page 397) 
Plaintiflf appeals this order arguing that the trial court did not find that Plaintiflf had 
the ability to pay attorney fees and did not enter sufficient Findings of Fact. 
Plaintiff argues that the Findings of Fact are not sufficient and the trial court 
abused his discretion by making the award. 
ARGUMENT 
1. DATE DIVORCE FINAL: The trial court directed the divorce should not 
be final until six months from the date of the Memorandum Decision. The indicated 
purpose of the delay is stated by the trial court in paragraph 9 of the FINDINGS 
(page 372): 
The Court concludes that this family situation justifies the Court not 
granting (sic.) the divorce become final for six months from the date 
of the Memorandum Decision to allow the parties to complete and/or 
accomplish the requirements set forth herein and to continue the 
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medical converge for payment of the medical expenses incurred and/or 
to be incurred by the parties. 
Plaintiff submits this is an abuse of discretion. 
The standard for review has been long established. 
We adhere to the qualifications set forth in the more recent 
expressions of this court: that the judgment will not be disturbed 
unless the evidence clearly preponderates against the finding of the 
trial court; or there has been a plain abuse of discretion; or where a 
manifest injustice or inequity is wrought. MacDonald v. MacDonald, 
236 P.2d 1066 (Utah 1951). 
Plaintiff argues to this court that the trial court's ruling constitutes a "plain 
abuse of discretion" and that "a manifest injustice or inequity" is created by the trial 
court's ruling. People who are party to a divorce action need and require finality 
and a termination of the relationship created by the marriage. Something has gone 
wrong with the relationship and both parties need a conclusion. Obviously they 
have not been able to resolve their differences - either their marital differences or 
the disagreement on the issues presented by the divorce proceeding - otherwise 
there would not be a trial. Plaintiff argues that the trial court's obligation is to 
fashion a reasonable and equitable plan dividing assets and debts and providing for 
spousal support as appropriate under statutory and case law. 
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When a marriage has failed, a court's duty is to consider the various 
factors relating to the situation and to arrange the best possible 
allocation of the property and the economic resources of the parties so 
that the parties and their children can pursue their lives in as happy 
and useful manner as possible. If it appears that the decree is so 
discordant with an equitable allocation that it will more likely lead to 
further difficulties and distress than to serve the desired objective, then 
a reappraisal of the decree must be undertaken. Read v. Read, 594 
P.2d 871 (Utah 1979). 
Plaintiff does not object to the delay of the entry of the divorce to provide 
medical coverage to the Defendant. Plaintiff does argue to this court that to use the 
period of the delay to create debt to the Plaintiff because of medical treatment to the 
Defendant is plain abuse of discretion and creates a manifest inequity and injustice. 
2. CUSTODY: The trial court awarded joint custody. Plaintiff argues that 
this award is contrary to law. UCA Section 30-3-10.12 states: 
(1) The court may order joint legal custody if it determines that joint 
legal custody is in the best interest of the child and: 
(a) both parents agree to an order of joint legal custody; or 
(b) both parents appear capable of implementing joint legal custody. 
To enter an order of joint custody in a situation where the parties do not agree 
to the order the court must (1) find it is in the child's best interest and, either (2) the 
parents must agree - which obviously is not the case here - or (3) find that both 
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parents appear capable of implementing joint custody. 
A review of the MEMORANDUM DECISION and the FINDINGS OF 
FACT discloses that the trial court did not find joint custody was in the child's best 
interest. 
Concerning the second requirement, i.e. that the parties either agree or are 
capable of implementing joint custody, the trial court noted in the FINDINGS at the 
fifth unnumbered paragraph within paragraph 2, "The Court is cognizant that joint 
custody is generally not appropriate where the parties, as here is evident, have 
strong disagreements between each other...." (page 369) 
The trial court's order of joint custody is contrary to law. The facts as found 
by the trial court precludes a joint custody order. 
The Plaintiff further argues that the trial court abused its discretion by not 
awarding custody to him. 
Many witnesses testified to Defendant's infidelity and drug use. Juan 
Chavez, Ann Marie Young, Ryan Thompson, Katie Lynn Anderson were witnesses 
called by Plaintiff. 
Juan Chavez testified twice. Mr. Chavez testified first on May 24,1996. His 
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testimony on May 24, 1996 was offered on the issue of alimony. Mr. Chavez 
testified that he knew Defendant before July 1995 (page 719); saw Defendant 
consume methamphetimines (page 721); Defendant brought marijuana to him (page 
721); was present with Defendant when controlled substances were being purchased 
and sold (page 722); saw Defendant consuming methamphetamine at the video 
store (page 729). Mr. Chavez testified again on October 1, 1996. Mr. Chavez 
testified at mat time that he met the Defendant in the summer of 1995 (page 1064); 
that Defendant "bought some weed and I sold her a little bit of meth." (page 1064); 
Defendant smoked marijuana (page 1064); Defendant brought marijuana to his 
apartment and they smoked it (page 1065); he sold Defendant methamphetamine 
three or four times (page 1066); he saw Defendant consume methamphetamine 
twice (page 1066); 
Arm Marie Young testified that she had known Defendant for about two and 
one-half years (page 1115); in 1995 she saw Defendant every day or at least every 
other day (page 1116); that she would arrive at Defendant's home in the mornings 
or, sometimes after 12 (page 1117); that about one-half of the times she arrived at 
Defendant's home she would find Defendant asleep and Cory would be watching 
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t.v. or fixing himself something to eat (page 1117); that she was concerned for Cory 
because of the things Defendant would say to him, i.e. that he was a little s-o-b and 
that she wished that he was never born, (page 1118); that Defendant would lock 
herself in her room (page 1119); that Defendant used marijuana and 
methamphetamine (page 1120); that of the times she was with Defendant in 1995 
she observed Defendant to use controlled substances "more than half — a lot." 
(page 1121); that in a normal week Defendant would use controlled substances 
"Three to four days out of the seven days." (page 1121); that she has seen 
Defendant use methamphetamine or marijuana in the car or at other friends' house 
(page 1123); that generally Defendant would use methamphetamines (page 1123); 
discussed with Defendant between five and ten times that Defendant would draw 
from the joint account to buy methamphetamine (page 1124); was present a couple 
of times when Defendant purchased controlled substances (page 1125); has tended 
Cory so Defendant could go buy controlled substances (page 1125); has seen 
Defendant shake Cory (page 1126); has been concerned because of the way 
Defendant would treat Cory (page 1126); has observed Defendant "brainwash" 
Cory against his father and tell Cory that his father is no good (page 1128-1129); 
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that these kinds of statements were made regularly (page 1129); that Defendant 
would take Cory to Defendant's parents so she could go and be involved with 
drugs (page 1130); that in 1995 Defendant would be absent for a couple of days 
every other week for drugs (page 1130-1131); that Defendant lived with another 
man, Troy Minchie, from October 1995 to January 19962 ( page 1132-1133); that 
Defendant had sex with Richie Wood once as a one-night-stand (page 1134); that 
Defendant had a sexual relationship with Lyle Bowman some time in 1995 ( page 
1135); that Defendant met Ryan Thompson at a motel and stayed the night the end 
of December, 1995 (page 1135-1136); that in her opinion Plaintiff ought to have 
custody of Cory because of Defendant's "mental abuse" (page 1158). 
Ryan Thompson testified that he had known Defendant for three or four 
months with the relationship beginning in the spring of 1996 (page 1166) and 
terminating the last of Jury, 1996 (page 1173); that the relationship terminated due 
to a problem with an ATM card when $653 was taken by Defendant (page 1163-
1162); that he observed Defendant use controlled substances, methamphetamine 
2Ms. Young testified that her relationship with Defendant terminated January, 1996. 
(page 1116) The parties separated for the final time July 28, 1995. (page 1276) 
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(page 1164); that Defendant used methamphetamine about one-half of the times he 
was with her (page 1165). 
Katie Lynn Anderson testified at the hearings on May 24,1996 and October 
1,1996. Ms Anderson testified on May 24,1996 that she had known Defendant all 
her life (page 836); that she had been more involved with Defendant the last year 
and a half (page 876); that during that time she observed Defendant change moods 
due to the divorce and a drug problem (page 877);that she has heard Defendant talk 
of suicide in September, 1995 when Defendant was "coming down off drugs" (page 
877-878); she has observed Defendant use "crank and weed" in the last year and 
a half (page 879); Defendant lived with Troy Minchie during the summer of 1995 
for about two months (879-880); saw Defendant and Ryan asleep in the bedroom 
at the home of Defendant's parents when Cory was in the home (page 881-882); 
Defendant had men overnight with Cory present ( page 882); Defendant was 
intimate with Lyle Goldman3 (page 880-884); Defendant would accompany a man 
named "Emo" to places he needed to go to sell methamphetamines during the 
3The transcript indicates an individual with the last name of "Goldman". The undersigned 
believes this is an error in transcription and should be "Bowman" which is the same individual 
mentioned by Ann Marie Young and referenced in her testimony at page 1135. 
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summer of 1995 before the parties separated (page 884); Defendant has smoked 
marijuana in the presence of Cory and other children (page 888) the last incident 
being about three or four weeks ago (page 888); has heard Defendant call Plaintiff 
names in front of Cory (page 889); has heard Defendant tell Cory "that his dad is 
an asshole" (page 889). 
Ms. Anderson testified on October 1,1996 mat she had known Defendant all 
her life (page 1220); that she had a substantial relationship with Defendant from 
about the spring of 1995 (page 1220); that during 1995 she had frequent contact 
with Defendant (page 1221); her last contact with Defendant was a couple days 
before "court last time"4 when she went to Defendant's parent's home, was taken 
downstairs by Cory to a room where Defendant was sleeping in bed with Ryan 
(page 1223); during 1995 she usually went to the parties home during the day and 
when she did she would usually find Defendant asleep ( page 1223); on these 
occasions she would ask Cory to try to wake Defendant but he could not so she 
would try but could not (page 1223); she was to the parties home seven to ten times 
4This refers to the hearing on May 24,1996. 
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of which Defendant was asleep four or five (page 1225); at these times there was 
no one watching Cory (page 1225); she telephoned every day during the summer 
of 1995 (page 1226); when Defendant was asleep and Cory answered the telephone 
she would ask him to try to wake the Defendant and sometimes Defendant would 
swear at Cory (page 1227); observed Defendant to use methamphetamine at least 
three times per week in 1995 (page 1228); Defendant had sex with a man at the 
Cowboy Club in the women's restroom about 1992 (page 1229-1231); Defendant 
acknowledged a sexual relationship with Troy Minchie (page 1232); Defendant was 
"intimate" with Lyle Bowman in exchange for drugs ( page 1235-1239);. 
Certain of Defendant's witnesses also discussed Defendant's drug use. 
Delvin McFarland is a clinical social worker in private practice ( page 1404) 
and saw Defendant on three separate occasions, July 9, 15 and 30, 1996 (page 
1406). Mr. McFarland testified that Defendant reported that she had not been on 
drugs since the middle of 1995 (page 1422)5; that at the time of Defendant's visit 
with him the drug use was under control ( page 1422). 
'These statements of Defendant to Mr. McFarland conflicts with the testimony of Ryan 
Thompson who observed Defendant's drug use in the summer of 1996. 
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Mr. McFarland also offered significant contribution to the issue of best 
interest of Cory when he testified that drug abuse is significant when it comes to 
parenting (page 1423); that he could not recommend that anyone have custody of 
a child if they were regularly using methamphetamine (page 1429);that Defendant 
needs more counseling (page 1439);that people using methamphetamines can not 
get off it without inpatient treatment (page 1441). 
Defendant's mother, Grace Olsen, testified that there came a time when she 
felt Defendant had a problem with drugs (page 1519); that she called Mr. Martin6 
in 1993 (page 1519); Defendant admitted that she had used drugs (page 1520). 
Defendant acknowledged drug use. Defendant admitted using 
methamphetamines in the summer of 1995 (page 1568) sometimes weekly, but not 
all the time (page 1569); she continued and indicated the use was from the middle 
of 1994 to fall 1995 "and a httle bit of this summer" (1996) (page 1569); that the 
average monthly use of methamphetamine was ten to twelve times (page 1569); 
Defendant's marijuana use was two times per month from January to June, 1995 
6Mr. Martin testified at trial on October 2, 1996. ( pages 121 - 163) Mr. Martin is an 
alcohol and drug specialist. ( page 121) 
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(page 1570); that she had drug therapy from Dr. Brown7 (page 1573); Defendant 
was pregnant at the time of trial (page 1574) about two months or six weeks along 
in the pregnancy (page 1576); that she was treated for a nervous breakdown 
November 27,1995 (page 1586); that she has threatened suicide (page 1586). 
There was testimony from Ryan Thompson that he saw Plaintiff use cocaine 
"quit' lefendanl kstified that Plaintiff 
physically abusive (page 1529-1530). 
Plaintiff is mindful of the many considerations enumerated by statute and in 
cases from the appellate courts of this State and will not attempt to list them here. 
See e.g. Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 41 (Utah 1982), Rosendahl v. 
Rosendahl, 876 P.2d 870 (Utah App. 1994), Tucker v. Tucker, 910 P.2d 1209 
(Utah 1996). 
Plaintiff submits that an overall reading of the MEMORANDUM DEC ISIO N 
and the FINDINGS OF FA^T nroduces the conclusion that the trial court was 
disposed to attempt to formulate a solution which would allow him to attempt to fix 
7Dr. Brown had been identified earlier in the hearing on October 2, 1996 as a psychiatrist 
during Delvin McFarlane's testimony and by Exhibit X. 
Defendant's drug problem and ultimately award custody to Defendant. This 
conclusion is, in part, the product of the trial court's requirement that the divorce 
not be finalized for six months to allow insurance coverage to remain to contribute 
to payment of inpatient treatment expenses and the further requirement that Plaintiff 
pay 81% of the cost not covered by insurance for that purpose. 
Plaintiff argues to this court that the rule announce by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, 599 P.2d 510 (Utah 1979) and reiterated in 
Shioji v. Shioji, 712 P.2d 197 (Utah 1985) applies here. That rule is, "Only where 
the trial court's judgment is so flagrantly unjust as to be an abuse of discretion, will 
this Court interpose its own judgment." Plaintiff submits the trial court's ruling is 
sufficiently unjust and contrary to the trial court's findings that this court should 
exercise its authority to direct the entry of an order awarding Plaintiff sole legal and 
physical custody of the minor child. 
3. SUBSEQUENT CUSTODY ORDER: The trial court ordered that either 
party may seek a review of the joint custody order "after Defendant completes 
inpatient drug/alcohol counseling...without a showing of a substantial change of 
material circumstances." Decree paragraph 3. (page 389) 
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Plaintiff argues this is an abuse of discretion and contrary to law. 
UCA Section 30-3-10.4 provides: 
(1) On the motion of one or both of the joint legal custodians the court may, 
after a hearing, modify an order that established joint legal custody if: 
(a) the circumstances of the child or one or both custodians have 
materially and substantially changed since the entry of the order to be modified or 
the order has become unworkable or inappropriate under existing circumstances; 
and 
(b) a modification of the terms and conditions of the decree WOUJ> 
an improvement for and in the best interest of the child, (emphasis added) 
Statute clearly requires a showing of changed circumstances. Plaintiff argues 
that the trial court's discretion does not extend to the point where a decree can 
suspend statute. 
Case law also indicates that modification of custody orders are a two step 
process. The first of the process is to establish a change of circumstances. Hogge 
v. Hogge, 649 P.2d 51 (Utah 1982), Shioji v. Staioji, 
Modification of divorce decrees must be initiated by petition. Rule 6-404 ( 
Plaintiff argues to this court that the trial court abused his discretion by trying 
to hold this case in a state of suspended animation to allow the Defendant to attend 
a drug/alcohol inpatient treatment program then revive the case for another look at 
the issue of custody. The Plaintiff and particularly the child have a right to have the 
case tried on the merits that exist at the time of trial. The trial court is obligated to 
issue a ruling based on the tacts presented at trial. The trial court may not like what 
it sees; however, to attempt to rehabilitate a party at the expense of the other is an 
abuse of discretion. 
In this case Defendant had an opportunity to rehabilitate herself. Insurance 
coverage was continued through the date of trial, (page 1391) Plaintiffs insurance 
provided for alcohol/drug treatment, (page 1389-1390) Defendant chose to 
continue to use drugs and engage in extra-marital relationships virtually to the time 
of trial, (pages 1162-1177) 
The proclivity of the trial court toward the Defendant is demonstrated by his 
indication in the FINDINGS OF FACT at paragraph 2 (page 368) where the trial 
court states: 
The Court concludes from the evidence that the Defendant 
herein is the primary care giver in this marital relationship and 
specifically relies upon the fact that during the stormy periods of this 
marriage the Defendant was always the one who took the child and 
cared for the child during the various periods of separation from the 
Plaintiff herein. 
The Court would, based upon that evidence as well as the age 
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of the child, place the custody in the mother and award reasonable 
visitation privileges to the father. However, under the circumstances 
and the testimony, the Court is concerned about the Defendant's drug 
use and believes that counseling and in-patient therapy should be part 
and parcel of the orders herein, (page 368) 
The overall tone of the trial court's decision is slanted in favor of the 
Defendant. 
Plaintiff argues to this court that the trial court's order in paragraph 3 of the 
Decree (page 388) concerning a subsequent custody order is contrary to law. 
4. DEFENDANT'S DRUG TREATMENT: The trial court conditioned 
Defendant's visitation on her entry and completion of a thirty to sixty day inpatient 
drug/alcohol treatment program. The cost of the program was to be paid 81% by 
Plaintiff and 19% by Defendant. Plaintiff appeals this ruling arguing that it is an 
abuse of discretion to create debt for a party. 
OF FACT unnumbered paragraph 2 within paragraph 2. (page 368) Plaintiff does 
not complain of the portion of the trial court's order conditioning visitation on 
Defendant's successful completion of an inpatient treatment program. Plaintiff does 
argue that the trial court abused his discretion when he required Plaintiff to pay any 
- let alone 81% - of the expense for treatment. 
Plaintiff argues that the trial court's function is to divide property and allocate 
debt - not create debt. Read v. Read, 594 P.2d 871 (Utah 1979), Newmeyer v. 
Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1987). 
Plaintiff requests this court reverse this portion of the Decree. 
5. RANDOM DRUG SCANS: The trial court required each party be subject 
to random drug scans. See Decree paragraph 5. (page 388) Plaintiff argues that this 
order, as to him, is an abuse of discretion as there is no finding of the trial court 
which would provide a basis for this order. The only testimony of a non-party 
indicating Plaintiffs involvement with drugs was Ryan Thompson. (Page 1172) 
The trial court did not enter any finding that he believed this portion of Mr. 
Thompson's testimony. Plaintiff denied drug use. (Page 1281) 
Plaintiff argues that this requirement, as to him, has no foundation in the 
FINDINGS OF FACT and, therefore constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
Plaintiff requests this court reverse this portion of the Decree. 
6. MHDTCAT, COVERAGE FOR CHILD: Paragraph 7 of the Decree (page 
389) requires that the parties share the medical expenses for the child not paid by 
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insurance proportionately with Plaintiff paying 81% and the Defendant paying 19%. 
Plaintiff argues this requirement is contrary to statute. 
UCA Section 78-45-7.15 (5) states: "The order shall require each parent to 
share equally all reasonable and necessary uninsured medical expenses, including 
deductibles co-payments, incum iependent children." (emphasis 
added) 
The trial court's requirement that Plaintiff pay 81% and the Defendant pay 
19% is contrary to statute. The statute uses the mandatory directive "shall" thus 
requiring the trial court to require equal contribution from the parties concerning 
these expenses. State Ex Rel M.C. 940 P2d 1229 (Utah App. 1997) 
Plaintiff requests this court direct the Decree be amended to require each 
party to pay one-half of the uninsured medical expenses, including deductibles and 
co-payments. 
> • TAX DEPENDENT: The trial court directed, in paragraph 8 of the 
Decree (page 389) that Plaintiff purchase the dependency allowance from the 
Defendant. The practical result is that Defendant was awarded the child as a 
dependent for tax purposes. This award was made by the trial court not 
withstanding the award of physical custody to Plaintiff. 
UCA Section 78-45-7.21 states: 
(1) No presumption exists as to which parent should be awarded the 
right to claim a child or children as exemptions for federal and state 
income tax purposes. Unless the parties otherwise stipulate in writing, 
the court or administrative agency shall award in any final order the 
exemption on a case-by-case basis. 
(2) In awarding the exemption, the court or administrative agency 
shall consider: 
(a) as the primary factor, the relative contribution of each parent 
to the cost of raising the child; and 
(b) among other factors, the relative tax benefit to each parent. 
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (2), the court or administrative 
agency may not award any exemption to the noncustodial parent if that 
parent is not current in his child support obligation, in which case the 
court or administrative agency may award an exemption to the 
custodial parent. 
(4) An exemption may not be awarded to a parent unless the award 
will result in a tax benefit to that parent. 
The FINDINGS OF FACT do not contain any analysis of this issue. The 
testimony indicates that the Plaintiff is employed (page 1279) and the Defendant is 
not employed (page 807). On that basis the only conclusion is that the benefit for 
the exemption can only go to the Plaintiff as the Defendant would not be required 
to file a return as she does not have income. Plaintiff testified about his 1995 tax 
return. He testified that for 1995 if he claimed Cory the tax liability would be 
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$1,898 and if he were to not claim Cory the tax obligation would be $2,768. (page 
479) 
Plaintiff's testimony established that claiming Cory as a dependent would be 
a benefit to him. Defendant did not produce any testimony on the issue. 
Obviously Plaintiff will contribute more to the child's expenses. The CHILD 
SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORKSHEET and the trial, irt's FINDINGS indicate 
that Plaintiff is contributing 81% of the cost of the child's care. 
Plaintiff submits that this portion of the trial court's order was an abuse of 
discretion. 
Plaintiff requests that this court direct that he be awarded the exemption. 
8. PROPERTY/DEBTS/ADJUSTMENT: The parties marital estate can be 
summarized as follows: 
ASSETS 
personal property $34,050 
land 53.500 
total assets $87,500 
DEBTS 
Plaintiff $23,237 
Defendant 3,950 
land 47.016 
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total debt $74,2038 
Net Estate $13,297 
The personal property figure is the sum of the two lists awarded to each 
party. The total value of the personal property awarded to Plaintiff is $13, 075. 
(FINDINGS OF FACT paragraph 14a, page 376) The total value of the personal 
property awarded to Defendant is $20,975. (FINDINGS OF FACT paragraph 14f, 
page 378) $13,075 + 20,975 = $34,050. The real property has a value of $53,500. 
(FINDINGS OF FACT paragraph 11, page 381) The gross marital estate is the sum 
of the personal property ($34,050) plus the real property ($53,500) for a total gross 
marital estate of $87,500. 
The allocation of marital debt is FINDINGS OF FACT paragraphs 16 and 17 
(page 381) The total marital debt (without medicals as indicated in footnote #8) is 
$74,403. This amount is the sum of the debts indicated in FINDINGS OF FACT 
paragraph 16 and 17 in the total sum of $27,187 plus the balance of the debt due on 
'These totals are taken from the FINDINGS OF FACT which do not include totals for the 
medical bills incurred by Defendant which the trial court ordered Plaintiff to pay. Exact totals of 
the medical bills were not provided the trial court by Defendant and the information was not 
available to Plaintiff. 
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the real estate of $47,016 (FINDINGS OF FACT paragraph 22, page 382). 
The net marital estate is $13,297. 
The trial court awarded personal property to Plaintiff valued at $13,075.9 The 
trial court awarded personal property to Defendant valued at $20,975. The trial 
court allowed the Defendant to chose between the two lists of property and then to 
substitute items as she may designate. (DECREE paragraph 11, page 393) Further 
the trial court granted the Defendant the opportunity to substitute six items from the 
list she did not choose and replace those items with items of equal value from her 
list. (DECREE paragraph 11, page 393) Also, the trial court required Plaintiff to 
pay to Defendant one-half of the equity in the real property. (DECREE paragraph 
21, page .1%) 
Plaintiff argues mat the trial court has abused its discretion in its distribution 
of property and allocation of debt. 
The trial court award to Plaintiff can be summarized as follows: 
'The MEMORANDUM DECISION said simply that Defendant was to choose between 
the two lists of personal property. Plaintiff's counsel, who prepared the FINDINGS and 
DECREE, included that portion of the FINDINGS and DECREE which awards list #1 to Plaintiff 
absent an election by Defendant. 
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personal property $ 13,075 
real property 53.500 
Sub-total $66,575 
debt 
misc. <23,237> 
real property <47.016> 
Sub-total <$70,235> 
Total award <$3,678> 
The trial court award to Defendant can be summarized as follows: 
personal property $20,975 
real property 3.240 (by payment from Plaintiff) 
Sub-total $24,215 
debt <3.950> 
Total award $20,265 
The trial court's obligation concerning the issue of property division and debt 
allocation is that the division be equitable. Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 
1276 (Utah 1987), Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1988). 
Plaintiff argues that the division of personal property and allocation of debt, 
as implemented in the Decree, constitutes an impossible situation virtually 
guaranteeing a return to court. Plaintiff submits the trial court's order concerning 
assets and debts, particularly the trial court's attempt to equalize the property 
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division constitutes an abuse of discretion. The order is hard to follow, as a 
practical matter. The order indicates Plaintiff is to "be allowed a credit of one-half 
of the value of all of the obligations he ultimately pays out-of-pocket" (Decree 
paragraph 13, page 394) and yet Plaintiff was ordered in paragraph 20 of the Decree 
(page 396) to pay bills the trial court seems to allow credit for. Further, since the 
value of the property awarded Defendant greatly exceeds the value of the property 
awarded Plaintiff, Plaintiff does not need credit. 
Plaintiff argues that a party to a divorce is entitled to a decree which contains 
finality, i.e. specifies items awarded and defines obligations, all in a clear fashion. 
The plan outlined by the trial court to accomplish a property award and allocation 
of debt is confusing and intricate. 
Plaintiff requests this court confirm the trial court's asset division and alter 
the allocation of debt to require Defendant to pay the medical/psychological bills 
incurred by her after the separation which bills are listed in Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 
under DEBTS at page 5 as items B.3 through and including B.9.10 Plaintiff testified 
10These debts are not considered in the totals used in the Plaintiffs argument as no 
amounts were attached by the trial court. 
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that these bills were incurred by Defendant after separation. (Page 465, lines 12-13) 
These debts should be ordered paid by Defendant. 
9. REAL PROPERTY: Plaintiff challenges the trial court's requirement that 
he pay Defendant one-half of the equity in the real property. Plaintiff argues that 
the trial court's overall disposition of assets did not properly take into consideration 
the disposition of the equity in the real property. 
Plaintiff requests this Court order that Plaintiff be awarded the real property 
free and clear of any claim by the Defendant. 
10. LOAN: This loan is listed on Plaintiffs Financial Declaration (Plaintiffs 
Exhibit 2) in the INSTALLMENT PAYMENTS portion on page 2 to Desertview 
Credit Union (Chevy Pickup). Plaintiff testified that the loan was obtained to cover 
an overdrawn checkbook and to pay other bills. (Page 514) Plaintiff was also 
subjected to cross examination concerning the loan and the disposition of the 
proceeds. (Page 520-525) Plaintiff specifically testified that the $8,500 was 
disbursed "in the last year or so." (Page 523) The Defendant also received the 
benefit of the loan. (Page 523) Defendant did not discuss the loan other than to 
indicate her desire for Plaintiff to pay it. (Page 801-802) 
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Plaintiff argues that there was no testimony before the trial court from which 
it could reasonable conclude that the parties did not reap equal benefit. There is no 
testimony from which the trial court could conclude that only the Plaintiff benefitted. 
Further, to require Plaintiff to pay this amount means that Plaintiff is required 
amount twice - once to the creditor and once to Defendant. 
Plaintiff submits that this ruling by the trial r i discretion. 
As the trial court required Plaintiff to pay this debt he should not be required to pay 
any amount to Defendant. 
1
 * ALIMONY: Plaintiff was ordered to pay $200 per month for five years. 
(Decree paragraph 23, page 396) The trial court found, at least for child support, 
that Plaintiff had gross monthly income of $3,432 (FINDINGS OF FACT paragraph 
8, page 372) and that the Defendant should Itc attributed minimum wage 
(FINDINGS OF FACT paragraph 8, page 372) 
that "but for the therapy and treatment which the Court concludes...was brought 
upon by the Defendant's own conduct...." (FINDINGS OF FACT paragraph 8, page 
372) thus, in effect, finding the Defendant was voluntarily under employed. 
It is apparent that the trial court believed that the Defendant used drugs and 
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required drug treatment. It is apparent that the trial court believed that the 
Defendant was responsible for her situation. The trial court said that Defendant's 
need for therapy and treatment was, "brought upon by the Defendant's own 
conduct". (FINDINGS OF FACT paragraph 8, page 372) 
The trial court did not make findings concerning Plaintiff's income other than 
referenced above. The Plaintiff submitted a Financial Declaration (Exhibit 2) 
indicating net income of $2,020 and expenses of $2,440. The trial court must have 
believed the Plaintiff concerning Plaintiff's income as the trial court's rinding of 
gross income for child support purposes mirrors Plaintiff's testimony of his gross 
income. There is nothing in the FINDINGS to indicate whether the trial court felt 
Plaintiff's represented expenses were reasonable. Plaintiff's Financial Declaration 
does indicate that Plaintiff's monthly budget leaves him $420 in the red. 
Defendant testified that she had a need for alimony of $1,000 per month, 
(page 788) Defendant testified to monthly expenses of approximately $1,500 per 
month, (page 811-814) 
Alimony awards are reviewed for clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion. 
Endrody v. Endrody, 914 P.2d 1166 (Utah App. 1996). Adequate findings of fact 
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are required for this court to review the issue of alimony. Willey v. Willey, 914 
P.2d 1149 (Utah App. 1996). Alimony is determined by the guidelines provided by 
statute (UCA Section 30-3-5) and case law. Case law indicates alimony is partly 
based on need and ability to pay. Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065 (Utah 
App. 
The trial court did not provide specifics. It does appear that based on the trial 
court's finding concerning Plaintiffs gross income when coupled with the debt load 
imposed by the trial court that Plaintiff does not have an ability to pay alimony. 
Plaintiff argues that the trial court's award of alimony was a clear and 
prejudicial abuse of discretion. 
Plaintiff requests this court direct that Plaintiff does not have the ability to pay 
alimony. 
\J DR. BURGESS: The .al court and counsel engaged in a discussion of 
the bill submitted by Dr. Burgess for her presence at trial 996. 
This discussion occurred when the case was called on October 2, 1996. (page 
1371-1383) The sum of the discussion was that Dr. Burgess was present at the trial 
at Defendant's request. Plaintiff had paid the entire cost of the evaluation - some 
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$2,750.00. (page 1379) Due to animosity over the bill for Dr. Burgess' appearance 
on May 2, 1996, Plaintiff did not request her presence at the custody trial on 
October, 1,1996. 
The trial court chose to order Plaintiff to pay this cost. 
Plaintiff argues this requirement is manifest injustice and is the last in a long 
line of rulings favoring the Defendant. Plaintiff argues that the Defendant must be 
required to assume some responsibility for her actions. Defendant requested Dr. 
Burgess to be present and she should be required to pay the bill. 
13. ATTORNEY FEES: Plaintiff was ordered to pay $5,000 for a portion 
of the attorney fees she incurred. 
An award of attorney fees is based on the financial need of the receiving 
spouse, the ability of the other spouse to pay and the reasonableness of the 
requested fees. Brinkerhoffv Brinkerhoff 324 UAR. 12 (Utah App. 1997), Bell 
v Bell 810 P2d 489 (Utah App. 1991). 
The Findings of Fact reference attorney fees in paragraph 30. (page 385) The 
Findings do not include any assessment or reference to Plaintiff's ability to pay. 
Plaintiff argues the trial court did not consider Plaintiff's ability to pay 
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attorney fees, especially in light of the other financial obligations imposed on 
Plaintiff by the trial court. 
Plaintiff requests this court determine that Plaintiff does not have the ability 
to pay attorney fees and reverse the trial court's order. Sorensen v Sorensen, 769 
P?il 8?0 (Utah App. 1989). 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff argues that the trial court's rulings are canted so severely in favor of 
the Defendant that the entire ruling loses the overall guiding light imparted to trial 
courts - i.e. order what is in the best interests of children on custody issues and 
make an equitable allocation of assets, debts and alimony. 
In this case the trial court awarded joint custody contrary to statute; continued 
the case for six months to allow Defendar obtain drug/alcohol counseling and 
required Plaintiff to pay 81% of the expense not paid by insurance; placed the i • T <• 
in a state of suspended animation and eliminated the statutory requirement of 
showing changed circumstances to modify a custody order; required the Plaintiff to 
pay 81% of the medical expenses for the child not paid by insurance when statute 
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requires a 50% contribution; awarded Defendant the child as a dependant for tax 
purposes contrary to statute; awarded assets and debts to Plaintiff totaling a 
negative $3,678 and awarded assets/debts to Defendant totaling $20,265; subjected 
the real property awarded to Plaintiff to a hen in favor of Defendant 
for all of the awards made; required Plaintiff to pay an $8,500 loan to the creditor 
and one-half thereof to Defendant; awarded $200 alimony to Defendant without an 
assessment of Plaintiffs ability to pay; ordered Plaintiff to assume a debt to Dr. 
Burgess created by Defendant and directed Plaintiff to contribute $5,000 towards 
Defendant's attorney fees. 
Plaintiff argues that a number of the trial court's rulings contravene statute. 
Some rulings contravene case law. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Plaintiff requests this Court: 
1. Custody: Award Plaintiff sole custody of Cory; 
2. Subsequent Custody Order: Eliminate the trial court's suspension of the 
requirement of establishing a change of circumstances to allow modification of the 
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custody award; 
7
 Defendant's Drug Treatment: Strike the trial court's requirement that 
Plaintiff pay any portion of Defendant's drug/alcohol counseling; 
random Drug Scans: Terminate the obligation for Plaintiff to submit to 
random druj 
5. Medical Coverage for Child: Bring tfre Decree into compliance with 
statute ty reqasamg rash party pay ufetaft of V®} «Rdkal «s3*&sfc<Mfc?oi&ty 
insurance; 
6. Tax Dependant: Allow Plaintiff to claim the child as a dependant for tax 
purposes; 
/ Propertv/Debts: Require Defendant to pay those costs associated with 
medical ii>. i! ..in , ,eparatu i«jflectc items 9 through 
paragraph 20A of the Decree (page 395) and award Plaintiff the real 
and clear of any claim by the Defendant; 
8. Loan: Strike the trial court's requirement that Plaintiff pay one-half of 
$8,500.00 to Defendant; 
9. Alimony Determine Plaintiff does not have the ability to pay alimony; 
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10. Dr. Burgess: Require Defendant to pay the cost associated with Dr. 
Burgess' presence at the trial on May 2,1996; 
11. Attorney's fees: Reverse the trial court's order that Plaintiff pay $5,000 
of Defendant's attorney fees. 
DATED this J 0 day of . 1997. 
JOJJNE. SCHINDLER 
attorney for PlaintiftfAPPELLANT 
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